GPT 5.5 (Pi)
high
The Sentry benchmark is a small, qualitative readout for Warden’s security
review behavior. It compares runs against known vulnerabilities from the public
getsentry/sentry repository.
This is not an exhaustive eval and it is not a proof that Warden will catch every future issue. It is a way to compare implementations, prompts, models, and runtimes against the same historical security corpus.
The corpus currently contains 86 validated vulnerabilities across 79 files and 6 historical Sentry commits. A benchmark run checks out each commit and scans only the files tied to known vulnerabilities at that commit.
That keeps the run focused. We are measuring whether Warden can recognize the same root causes, not whether it can discover unrelated issues across the whole Sentry repository.
The score table is the headline and sorts by known-corpus recall. The cost table ranks runs by recorded provider cost per known corpus finding. This matrix only includes complete runs with no failed chunks and per-chunk trace data.
Timing remains in result metadata for diagnostics, but the overview does not rank it. Provider load, network conditions, retries, queueing, and the benchmark host can materially change wall time. Recall and cost are the stable comparison signals.
high
high · Production models
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high · Production primary
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default
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medium
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Lowest cost per known corpus finding first.
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high · Production models
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high · Production primary
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As of August 21, 2026, the getsentry organization baseline runs Warden 0.46.2
on Pi. It uses openrouter/x-ai/grok-4.5 at high effort for the primary review
and openrouter/openai/gpt-5.6-luna at high effort for auxiliary extraction,
verification, and merge calls. The source is the checked-in
getsentry/.github configuration.
The matrix labels the July Grok row as Production primary because its runtime, primary model, and effort match production. That run predates the explicit Luna auxiliary configuration, so it is not an exact measurement of the current model stack. New rows record both model lanes and receive the Production models label only when both match. That label covers the model lanes, not every workflow setting. Corpus runs keep the standardized 100-turn limit and explicit historical target lists; production uses the runtime’s 50-turn default and normal pull request selection.
The controlled production-model row found 37 of 86 known entries and emitted 48 findings at a total cost of $29.25, or $0.79 per known entry. It ranks second among the 20 stable rows for known-corpus recall and sixth for cost per known entry.
Compared with the July Grok row, it found four more known entries and cost $9.39 less, a 24% reduction. The two rows share 25 known entries. The current row found 12 that the July row missed, while the July row found eight that the current row missed. The comparison includes more than the auxiliary model: the current row uses Warden 0.46.2 and an explicit Luna high auxiliary lane, while the July row used Warden 0.39.0 and did not record its auxiliary model. These single runs do not isolate which change caused the difference.
At nearly the same total cost as K3 high, the production model stack found 10 more known entries. K3 max remained cheaper at $19.37 but found five fewer. This makes the production stack the stronger recall result in this sample, while K3 max remains more cost-efficient.
The final merge also matters. In the last two shards, scan-time findings exactly matched the workflow-disconnect and system-option logging corpus bugs. The auxiliary merge retained different same-file findings instead. The standardized score follows final Warden output, so it gives no credit for those two dropped matches. The 37/86 result measures the full system, including this merge loss, rather than only the primary model’s scan output.
The historical K3 max run remains the strongest Kimi result on this corpus. It found 32 of 86 known entries. K2.6 found 31, K3 high found 27, and K3 low found 16. Across the 20 stable rows now published, those results rank fifth, sixth, eighth, and eighteenth by known-corpus recall.
K3 max also has the best Kimi cost efficiency at $19.37, or $0.61 per known entry. K3 low cost $10.28, or $0.64 per known entry, but found half as many known issues. K3 high cost $28.14, or $1.04 per known entry. K2.6 cost $67.18, or $2.17 per known entry. By cost per known entry, K3 max ranks third overall, K3 low fourth, K3 high eleventh, and K2.6 seventeenth.
K2.6 spent much more time carrying context through long investigations. Its selected traces contain 2,440 agent turns and the row records 105.7 million input tokens. K3 max used 701 turns and 9.7 million input tokens. The extra work did not improve recall. For a single Kimi review, max is the best default in these samples. Low is useful as a cheaper screen. High and K2.6 do not move the recall-cost frontier.
The matched sets are not nested. K2.6 and K3 max share only 13 known entries and cover 50 in union. K3 low and max share 11 and cover 37 in union. Similar headline scores do not mean that two runs find the same bugs, and a higher effort run is not a strict superset of a lower effort run. These remain single-run samples, not deterministic model guarantees.
The corpus matches are the strongest evidence that findings are real: scoring
requires the same root bug at the same historical commit. The non-matches were
also reviewed individually. Some describe credible separate issues, including
timing-unsafe flag-secret comparisons, a Slack autofix membership gap, and a
conditional Bitbucket forwarded-IP bypass. Others are conditional or
unsupported, such as treating a token encrypted for Seer as exposed plaintext.
They remain not-known, receive no recall credit, and still need owner triage
or exploit reproduction before being treated as confirmed vulnerabilities.
K3 low completed all 156 chunks without repair. K2.6 and K3 high use exact replacements only for failed chunks; clean original chunks were not resampled. Their published costs include the full main runs and every targeted repair. Raw JSONL traces remain withheld pending sensitive-data review.
GPT 5.6 Luna high uses Pi directly as openai/gpt-5.6-luna. It found 36 of
86 known entries and emitted 57 findings. This puts it behind GPT 5.5 high and
the production model stack, and ahead of the historical Grok 4.5 high row on
known-corpus recall. Thirty-three emitted findings matched 36 unique corpus
entries. The other 24 findings described different bugs and did not count.
The run cost $56.98, or $1.58 per known corpus finding. All 156 final chunks completed with traces. One MS Teams chunk lost its terminal OpenAI stream event in the main shard. A parallelism-1 repair replaced that exact chunk, and the recorded cost includes both the main shard and the full repair run.
Grok 4.5 high uses Pi through OpenRouter as openrouter/x-ai/grok-4.5.
It found 33 of 86 known entries and emitted 41 findings. It trails GPT 5.5
high, the production model stack, and GPT 5.6 Luna high on known-corpus recall.
Thirty-two emitted findings matched 33 unique corpus entries because one
Atlassian JWT finding covered two entries. The other nine findings did not
count because they described different bugs in the same files.
The matched findings cover a broad range of security boundaries. Grok found cross-project and cross-organization authorization gaps, OAuth and JWT validation problems, unsigned or replayable webhooks, exposed credentials, and four client-side injection issues. It also caught narrower logic errors, including the account-merge expiry bypass, pinned-search ownership issue, and workflow detector disconnect authorization gap.
Grok cost $38.65, nearly the same as GPT 5.5 low at $39.36, while finding five more known entries. Post-processing and verification cost $11.77 because the run produced more candidate findings. All 156 chunks completed with traces and no repair runs.
The full-run timing is not comparable. macOS entered idle sleep during the fifth shard and stayed in sleep or dark wake through the final shard. The first four shards completed before sustained sleep and covered 90 chunks with a 62.3-second P50, 3.4-minute P90, and 5.4-minute maximum. Grok was not fast, but the recorded 217.5-minute total and 81.6-minute maximum chunk were inflated by the sleeping benchmark host. The public comparison does not rank timing.
Sonnet 5 high found 22 of 86 known entries and emitted 27 findings. That makes it competitive, but not better than Sonnet 4.6 high on this corpus. It costs more than Sonnet 4.6 on Pi, emits fewer final findings, and trails Sonnet 4.6 by three known matches.
This is the clearest runtime comparison. Pi found 25 of 86 known entries. The Claude SDK found 24 of 86. Both emitted 32 findings.
The quality result is close. The operating profile is not. Claude SDK recorded $103.59 total cost, compared to $19.84 for Pi. The trace summaries point to larger repeated context in Claude SDK runs, not a matching gain in recall.
Pi found 21 of 86 known entries and emitted 24 findings. Claude SDK found 17 and emitted 17. Pi was also cheaper: $21.31 total versus $79.56.
The trace shape differs from Sonnet 4.6. Pi does more turns and more tool executions here, but each turn carries much less input context. Claude SDK’s extra cost is mostly context volume, not more tool fanout.
The direct Pi comparison favors Opus 4.6 high on recall. Opus 4.6 found 23 of 86 known entries. Opus 4.8 found 21. Both emitted 24 findings.
Opus 4.8 is more selective under the current prompt and corpus. It exits more investigations earlier, which lowers cost and tool fanout, but it misses enough known vulnerabilities to trail Opus 4.6 here.
DeepSeek V4 Pro found 23 of 86 known entries and emitted 30 findings. V4 Flash found 18 and emitted 27.
Flash is cheaper because the model price is lower, not because it does less work. It used more turns, more tool executions, and more scan input tokens than V4 Pro. The result is not just a cheaper Opus-shaped run; it explores much more context and lands on a different set of known findings.
GLM 5.2 uses Pi through OpenRouter as openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.2 with explicit
--effort high. OpenRouter reports high as the model’s default reasoning
effort, with xhigh also available. The recorded row scans the same 156 chunks
and leaves Warden’s finding verifier enabled. It found 15 of 86 known corpus
entries and emitted 18 total findings.
The main result is lower recall, not noisy output. Fifteen of the 18 emitted findings matched known corpus entries. The three non-matches were same-file or nearby security findings that did not match the corpus issue: a LaunchDarkly timing-unsafe compare rather than the Statsig timestamp freshness bug, a Bitbucket forwarded-IP/signature bypass rather than invalid-signature HMAC logging, and a Sentry App issue-link SSRF rather than the event-scope corpus issue.
Operationally, GLM 5.2 exposed a Warden compatibility problem. Many clean
no-finding chunks returned prose instead of the required {"findings":[]} JSON.
Those records had traces, usage, and zero findings, but Warden marked them as
extraction_no_findings_json. Four shards therefore use combined-clean
artifacts: traced zero-finding extraction failures were normalized to empty
ok chunks, and targeted repair records were used where reruns produced cleaner
records. One large seer_rpc.py chunk also exceeded OpenRouter’s effective
1M-token context limit in the full shard; rerunning the failed target set with
--parallel 1 removed the context failure.
Recorded cost for the validated artifacts is $5.26: $4.94 scan cost plus $0.32
post-processing and verification overhead. That excludes the abandoned xhigh
attempt and dirty failed rerun artifacts. GLM 5.2 used 8.3M input tokens and
422k output tokens across the validated row, with a 39.4-second P50 chunk time
and a 6.6-minute P90. The row is useful, but the parser issue should be fixed
before treating GLM 5.2 as a routine unattended benchmark target.
The Sentry vulnerability corpus lists the known issues used for scoring. Each entry includes the repository SHA, the affected file, a short vulnerability description, and the relevant code snippet.
Use the running guide to reproduce the benchmark, add a new model run, and record sanitized result metadata.